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The pursuit of the label ‘world-class’ university is spreading across the globe. Nationally 
and institutionally, excellence in global higher education has become a matter of policy 
that affects diverse interests. International rankings form an important input and 
stimulation in this positional competition for ‘world-class’ status. 
 
I will discuss some aspects of the incredible popularity and growing importance of 
international rankings. First, I want to discuss conceptual issues in understanding the role 
of rankings in creating social order. Second, I explore how an increased focus on 
rankings is affecting political action as well as institutional behavior including branding. 
Third, I turn to the potential costs of playing the ranking game in international higher 
education. And finally, if we have a moment left, I want to share thoughts on what can be 
done to regulate and limit potentially damaging effects. 
 
Creating social order: sorting, ranking and field formation 
International university rankings developed in times of global educational expansion and 
internationalization of higher education. Basically, they contribute to the creation of some 
social order in the bewildering world of contemporary mass higher education. Higher 
education has become or is on its way of becoming a mature industry. 
In this wider context, international university rankings provide an input for the 
construction of an institutional field as Linda Wedlin has shown. This field is not just 
populated by the universities themselves but by all those organizations which participate 
in the formation of the field, such as ranking organizations, the media, political agencies 
or data providers.  
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This field also provides an arena for contestation between actors; about what the 
appropriate criteria for comparison, success and legitimacy are - for example those in 
dominant institutions aiming to maintain the orthodoxy and hence the criteria on which 
the hierarchy of institutions exists; and subordinate but rising institutions which aim to 
change old rules and introduce new criteria into the field which have the potential to shift 
these institutions higher up in the hierarchy. Rankings as well as data providers also 
compete with each other for public attention and policy impact and eventually for profits. 
 
If they are powerful enough, rankings contribute to the establishment of belonging and 
distinction, and set rules and criteria for those who are or want to be member of the club. 
Value statements of better and worse and of climbing or falling provide important signals 
to the members and the outsiders of the field, to relevant others; for example policy-
makers who want to know where their best universities are or where improvement is 
needed or parents who want to know where to send their children.  
 
And rankings provide, of course, an input for competition between universities; 
competition for organizational reputation and reputation related benefits. International 
rankings stimulate competition across borders and between nations and regions. They 
stimulate investments according to the rules of the ranking game as everyone strives to 
improve their competitive positions. Eventually rankings also provide an input to limit 
competition in cases where membership and rank in the various league tables reach some 
stable order. In this very sense, rankings provide rhetorical devices with potentially 
important material consequences- some of which get enacted as self-fulfilling prophecies: 
external audiences’ reaction to rankings (minor differences become bigger because of 
rankings stressing difference),  
the influence of prior rankings on surveys that determine future rank (people responding 
to reputation surveys are influenced by prior rankings),  
the use of rankings to make funding decisions within universities (budgets become linked 
to ranking results, money supports success),  
and how activities within universities conform to rankings criteria (aligning the 
organisation and its performance with ranking criteria). 
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Rankings thus are co-producers of what they measure. 
 
Rankings do Aristotelian science as Michel Focault has analyzed it: Things get classified, 
sorted into different categories and vertically ordered. They transform qualities into 
quantities, making it easier to access and process information, and simplification often 
makes information seem more authoritative. Lists are reassuring and simple sound bites 
of information have their own beauty. March and Simon (1958) have shown how such 
processes of simplification obscure the discretion, assumptions, and arbitrariness that 
unavoidably infuse information. Consequently, uncertainty and contingency get 
absorbed. Information appears more robust and definitive than it would if presented in 
more complicated forms.  
 
In fact, international rankings have been positioned as trustworthy and reliable 
transparency tools, as consumer information and evidence-base for policy-making. 
Unfortunately, the reality is that current international university rankings receive serious 
critique as regards their methodology, presentation and marketing. They provide 
incentives and legitimacy for what Robert Frank has analyzed as the ‘academic arms 
race’; and rankings contribute to a narrow representation of the role of universities in 
society and economy. 
 
Setting the standards: The bias of international ranking 
 
Methodological critique of some aspects of rankings has been wide-spread. Take for 
example the QS and Times Higher rankings. The most important indicator is peer 
appraisal which involves in this case an international survey among senior academics. In 
fact, this has been little more than an opinion poll that measures recognition of research-
based reputation among peers. As we are well aware, reputation is by no means identical 
to performance. Response rates have also been suspiciously low. We know that at least in 
one case, pro-active mobilization of academics for participation had astounding effects on 
the standing of the country’s universities in the ranking. Such methodological problems 
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can, of course, be resolved. It takes, however, concerted and continuous action to put 
pressure on ranking organizations. 
 
The more important issue seems to me that rankings set quite uniform, narrow and biased 
standards in the definition of “world class”. They unify and de-contextualise their objects 
of observation – diversity and fragmentation get suppressed except for vertical variation. 
They measure what is measurable in quantities that signal quality; what they exclude 
appears to have less value. They organize a ‘beauty contest’ in which someone has to be 
the winner; however small the difference to number two might be. Quite frequently 
differences between groups of ten or twenty institutions are statistically insignificant. 
They favor research over all other contributions of universities. They focus on a certain 
type of research output and recognize certain fields of research. They tend to rank 
universities as a whole and neglect important internal differences. They also favor older 
and larger comprehensive universities. 
 
Playing the ranking game: Policy initiatives and institutional strategies 
 
Competition for international rankings is, however, an important trigger for a growing 
number of countries implementing policies for supporting ‘world class’ in their national 
higher education system. Notions of excellence have implicitly or explicitly been based 
on self-governance within a semi-autonomous academic field. As regulatory governance 
becomes more risk-concerned, information systems become a useful tool for identifying 
funding opportunities and risks, and eventually become incorporated into regulatory 
procedures by public agencies as a form of risk management. The rise of audits, 
evaluations and accreditations has been one remarkable development. International 
rankings provide another prominent example for the rapid diffusion of ‘transparency 
tools of excellence’ around the globe. Global competition for positional advantage in 
league tables has in turn been one trigger for a growing number of governments 
implementing policies for establishing ‘world class’ in their national higher education 
and science systems. And vertical stratification has also become an issue in systems with 
a prevailing view on universities being equal in status and performance. 
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I would thus assume that a study of the political process would identify empirical traces 
of two different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive schools of thinking on 
international policy diffusion. Constructivists trace policy norms to expert epistemic 
communities and international organisations, who define ‘modernity’. The ‘world polity’ 
approach depicts an increasingly global political culture comprising broad consensus on 
the set of appropriate social actors, appropriate societal goals, and means for achieving 
those goals. Both legitimate ends and appropriate means are shared social constructs. 
Competition theorists offer another theory of diffusion that also points to changes in 
incentives. In this case, the changes are wrought by direct competitors. Governments or 
organizations have little choice but to choose certain policies and practices, the thinking 
goes, when their direct competitors have done so. At the same time, we should not be 
surprised that the programs actually implemented did not mean a clear cut break with all 
elements of the traditional regulatory arena and order. Traditional norms and values as 
well as local political preferences shape the policy formulation and implementation to 
some extent. 
 
The work of Espeland and Sauders has shown that universities have little chance to 
escape the ranking game. Buffering universities from rankings is difficult if not 
impossible – depending on the regulatory environment and the position of the university. 
They get internalized, a source for internal discipline as well as for strategic responses. 
And international research rankings play out in the very heartland of the academic system 
– the struggle for reputation as a symbolic capital and related economic capital of 
research money. 
 
Rankings and branding have a mutually re-enforcing effect. Rankings provide signals to 
universities to engage in reputation management and branding. In the most general – and 
frequently unaddressed - sense rankings make universities think about themselves as an 
organization. By comparing and ranking universities as a whole they contribute to the 
idea that the organization matters, that strategic actorhood of universities as organisations 
has to be developed, that reputation management and organizational branding are needed. 
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In a more specific sense, some rankings use indicators that invite universities to actively 
engage in influencing their image in the eyes of relevant others. Prestige and reputation 
surveys offering halo-susceptible opinions are most obvious examples of where 
universities can try to manage their perception by others. On the other hand, more and 
more universities use rankings to brand themselves, to market themselves by using the 
over-simplistic representation of their success in rankings. Some are even courage 
enough to announce their future ambitions in climbing the rankings as part of their image 
projects. And success and failure of university leaders, sometimes also their salaries, 
might get tied to organizational success measured by ranking positions. Obviously, such 
practices provide additional legitimacy to the rankings. When universities put their 
rankings on their Web sites, brochures, or press releases, they are complicit in producing 
and disseminating identities that align with rankings, which in turn might shape internal 
processes of identification. Positional competition partly plays out in an image game, a 
process that works at the edges but seems to become more edgy. In a domain of 
intangibles, the greater the uncertainty and ambiguity of a product the stronger the 
potential effect of skillfully managed activities aiming at their perception by relevant 
others. In consequence, it becomes a real question to what extent branding and the co-
production of images in the ranking game reflects or deviates from reality. 
 
The costs involved: waste, isomorphism, and neglect of diversity 
 
International competition and vertical stratification have thus become visible including 
systems where universities have traditionally enjoyed broad parity of status and where 
there is now a marked shift to engage with international rankings. Governments are 
privileging a core of universities to represent the country in this race. Institutions develop 
strategic responses to adapt to the performance criteria and standards created by 
international rankings. Investments made in this international arms race are not 
necessarily wasted but there is a real challenge due to the competitive dynamics that 
govern such expenditures. The arms race is already costly and is likely to become even 
more costly in the future when more and more countries and institutions engage in this 
competition. And when everybody invests very few will gain a competitive advantage, if 
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at all. The competition continues on a higher level of performance which is likely to set 
incentives for further investment.  
 
Playing the ranking game may also have perverse effects on national and institutional 
strategies. Actions might be taken that are not aligned with public policy goals but that 
have the sole aim of moving up the list(s). Allotted public funds then risk being wasted as 
well. 
 
International rankings contribute to deliberate stratification by constructing new 
boundaries and defining a heartland and a periphery. How these boundaries are 
constructed is to a large extent dictated by the international reputational hierarchies that 
already prevail, which are centered on research output. The world-class research 
university thus becomes the ultimate template for success. It becomes the Holy Grail 
which many universities are striving for, even if only a few of them will be successful. 
However, competition will lead to the imitation of the best and thus to a further 
standardization of research universities internationally. 
 
In this context, concern for the wider purposes of higher education seems to have few 
effective champions. The public mission of higher education, which Craig Calhoun has 
written about, is challenged by these developments. What seems likely to happen is a loss 
of reputation attached to other purposes of universities. The privileging of academic 
research outputs leads to the consequent reduction in the diversity of institutional 
missions; or, at least, the subordination of those other missions to research. Issues of 
access and equity, the role of higher education for social mobility, the quality of teaching 
and learning, the contribution of a university to the community and regional 
development, to name but a few examples, do not play a role in international rankings. 
This risks reducing the diversity, adaptability and resilience of the higher education 
system as a whole; something of central concern for public policy and the governance of 
higher education and research. 
 
A forward look 
 8 
 
In the light of what has been said above: how do we look forward? One question to be 
asked is whether we can turn back from rankings? I guess that this is unlikely to happen 
for a number of reasons: they tap into a strong desire for ordering and ranking; they can 
build on what I have called ‘the competitive turn’ in international education that goes 
along with monitoring, benchmarking, ‘naming, faming and blaming’. They appeal to 
traditional informal reputational hierarchies in science as well as deeply institutionalized 
struggles for research-based academic capital as the gold standard.  
 
And what if we assume that rankings are here to stay? 
Public policies are needed that appreciate and actively support the multiple roles of 
contemporary universities and the varieties of excellences that they comprise. I believe 
that the study of higher education and research has to play a public role in this struggle in 
counter-balancing the ranking hype. Distinctions that limit competition for world class 
research excellence need to be made. Such distinctions should, of course, be well 
informed. 
 
The growing number and influence of international rankings call for quality assurance 
and transparency as regards their own procedures and outcomes. First steps are 
undertaken in this direction. In order to assure that rankings meet high standards, the 
Observatory on Academic Ranking and Excellence plans to carry out an audit of the main 
international and national academic rankings. This process will, however, only gain 
credibility if it is used by the majority of the main ranking compilers and if can show 
some independence from these. 
 
Finally, classifications and rankings are needed that pay respect to the diversity or roles 
and missions of universities within different contexts and conditions. We have built an 
international Consortium that conceptualizes and tests the feasibility of an alternative 
multi-dimensional global ranking. The basic approach is to compare only institutions 
which are similar and comparable in terms of their missions and structures. Field-based 
rankings will focus on a particular type of institution and develop and test a set of 
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indicators appropriate to these institutions by using a grouping approach rather than a 
league table approach. The design will compare not only the research performance of 
institutions but will include teaching and learning as well as other aspects of university 
performance. This is a real challenge in terms of methodological feasibility as well as in 
terms of political support and public understanding. The challenge is worth the effort in 
order to raise awareness of the multiple roles and excellences of our universities in 
international classifications and rankings. 
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